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Timing Is Not on Your Side: Missouri Retroactively Limits  
Punitive Damages 
 







Limitations on punitive damages have led to many constitutional 
challenges. While statutory restrictions on punitive damages are generally 
upheld as constitutional, there is limited case law regarding the application of 
a retroactively enacted punitive damages cap. However, the Missouri 
Western District Court of Appeals recently applied a punitive damages cap 
retroactively to a cause of action filed after the limitation was in effect, but 
accrued before the enactment. The court reasoned that limiting punitive 
damages is a procedural, rather than substantive statute; thus, the Missouri 
Constitutional provision prohibiting retroactivity of laws did not apply.  
 
Timing was not on the side of the plaintiff. In fact, the plaintiff might 
have had better luck in one of the other states that has implemented a punitive 
damages cap and held that such limitations are substantive. A closer 
examination of the history of Missouri law suggests the distinction between 
substantive and procedural is not as simple as the Western District Court of 
Appeals made it appear. Part II of this note summarizes the facts, procedural 
posture, and holding of the instant case, City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. 
Stations. Part III explores the legal background of retroactively applying 
statutes, including those pertaining to punitive damages. Next, Part IV 
describes the majority opinion in McCall and examines the Western District 
Court of Appeal’s rationale. Finally, Part V examines the modern trend 
among states that have implemented similar statutes limiting punitive 
damages and analyzes how the Western District Court of Appeal’s decision 
differs from this trend.  
 
 
                                                
1 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192 (Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014). 
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
 
During construction of a sewer upgrade project in the City of 
Harrisonville (“the City”), a contractor for the City discovered that a service 
station’s underground storage tank system had been leaking petroleum 
products, contaminating the soil. 2  McCall Service Stations (“McCall”) 
owned this underground storage tank system until 2000, when it sold the 
service station to Fleming Petroleum (“Fleming”). 3 The plaintiff, City of 
Harrisonville, brought claims for nuisance and trespass against McCall and 
Fleming. 4 Additionally, the City brought claims for fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentation against the Missouri Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance 
Fund (“the Fund”).5  
 
The Fund, created in 1989 by the Missouri Legislature, provides 
insurance to service station owners for the cleanup costs associated with 
spills and leaks from underground petroleum storage tanks.6 In September 
1997, McCall discovered its underground gasoline storage tank system was 
leaking and contacted the Fund.7 The Fund and McCall had an environmental 
engineer investigate the leak, and the engineer determined that the leak 
contaminated the soil surrounding McCall’s tank system with petroleum, and 
that the contamination had migrated toward a nearby creek on the north side 
of the service station.8 The environmental engineer notified the Department 
of Natural Resources and was hired by the Fund to monitor the leak.9 
Following these events, McCall sold the service station to Fleming in 2000.10  
 
In 2003, the City began constructing a sewer upgrade project.11 As 
part of the project, the City planned to install new sewer piping under the 
                                                
2 City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. Stations, No. WD 74429, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 




6 Id. at *2-3.  
7 Id. at *2.  
8 Bob Fine was hired by the Fund to investigate and monitor the leak. Id. at *3. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. at *3. 
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street adjacent to Fleming’s service station. 12 Additionally, it planned to 
install a portion of piping adjacent to a nearby creek.13 The original bid for 
the sewer upgrade project was with Rose-Lan Construction (“Rose-Lan”) for 
$19,061.31.14 During construction, Rose-Lan encountered soil that was 
contaminated by petroleum products.15 The City contacted the Department of 
Natural Resources, which informed the City about the Fund hiring an 
environmental engineer to monitor the contamination in 1997.16 Per the 
City’s request, the Fund hired the same environmental engineer who 
determined that the gasoline from the service station was responsible for the 
soil contamination in the City’s sewer easement.17 
 
The City and the Fund began discussions about the best way to 
complete construction of the sewer upgrade project and to address the 
contaminated soil.18 The City’s engineer estimated a cost of more than 
$500,000 for the removal and replacement of contaminated soil.19 The Fund 
suggested leaving the contaminated soil in place and substituting petroleum-
resistant pipes as a more cost-effective approach.20 The Fund, through Pat 
Vuchetich, an employee of the Fund’s third-party administrator, encouraged 
the City to hire Midwest Remediation to install the petroleum-resistant 
pipe.21 The bid was for $175,161.41.22 Vuchetich indicated that the Fund 
would be responsible for payment of $135,571, which was calculated by 
subtracting Rose-Lan’s cost of the relevant section of pipe from the cost of 
Midwest Remediation’s work.23 
 
                                                
12 Id. at *3-4. 
13 Id. at *4. 
14 Id. at *7. 
15 Id. at *4. 
16 The environmental engineer was Bob Fine. Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at *4-5. 
19 Id. at *5. 
20 Id. 
21 Original bid to install the petroleum-resistant pipes was made by BV Construction for 
$190,226.38. However, Vuchetich decided to encourage the City to hire Midwest 
Remediation instead. Id. at *5-6. 
22 Id. at *6. 
23 Id.  
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On April 15, 2004, the City held a meeting with all parties.24 During 
this meeting, Vuchetich expressed concerns that Rose-Lan’s initial bid was 
too low. 25 Rose-Lan subsequently revised the bid upward to $25,138.41.26 
This revised bid would effectively reduce the amount the Fund would be 
responsible for as contaminated-related costs because the Fund was paying 
the City for the costs of Midwest Remediation’s work minus the cost of 
Rose-Lan’s bid for constructing the relevant section of piping.27 The City 
administrator, City engineer, and the Rose-Lan representative “left the 
meeting with the understanding that the Fund wanted the City to hire 
Midwest Remediation for the project.” 28 Further, they understood that “the 
Fund would reimburse the City for Midwest Remediation’s costs, less the 
amount that the City would otherwise have paid Rose-Lan for the affected 
portion of the sewer project.”29 
 
Various discussions regarding payment of the project between the 
City and the Fund occurred in the following months. 30 On at least two 
occasions, Vuchetich offered to settle the Fund’s liability by paying $50,000 
to the City.31 However, after the City authorized Rose-Lan to subcontract 
with Midwest Remediation, the City’s attorney sent a letter to Vuchetich, 
“stating that the City was going forward in reliance on his promise that the 
Fund would pay the full amount of Midwest Remediation’s costs.”32 
Ultimately, the Fund did not reimburse the City for Midwest Remediation’s 
work.33 
 
                                                
24 All parties included: Pat Vuchetich, representing the Fund; Dianna Wright, the City 
administrator; Ted Martin, the City engineer; Steve Mauer, the City’s attorney; Shaun 
Thomas, representing Midwest Remediation; and Willman Rextroat, representing Rose-
Lan Construction. Id. at *7. 
25 Id.  
26 The original bid for the sewer upgrade project was $19,061.31. Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at *7-8.  
31 Id. at *8.  
32 Letter was written on August 4, 2004. The City’s attorney also made a demand for 
payment. Id.  
33 Id. 
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In November 2005, the City filed suit against the Fund for fraudulent 
and negligent misrepresentation.34 It also filed suit against McCall and 
Fleming, the former and present service station owners, for nuisance and 
trespass.35 The City sought compensatory and punitive damages against all 
defendants.36 During a jury trial, the circuit court granted the City’s motion 
for a directed verdict on liability regarding the nuisance and trespass claims 
against the service station owners.37  
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the City on all claims and 
awarded the City a total of $172,100.98 in compensatory damages against 
McCall, Fleming, and the Fund.38 Further, the jury awarded punitive damages 
of $100 against McCall, $100 against Fleming, and $8,000,000 against the 
Fund.39 The circuit court entered judgment accordingly.40 
  
McCall, Fleming, and the Fund each filed post-trial motions.41 
Among other things, the Fund argued that the punitive damages award 
exceeded the cap on punitive damages found in MO. REV. STAT. § 
510.265.1(2), which limited punitive damages to “[f]ive times the net amount 
of the judgment awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant.”42 The Fund 
also argued that the punitive damages award violated the due process 
requirements of the United States and Missouri Constitutions.43 The trial 
court remitted the punitive damages award to $2,500,000, dismissing the § 
510.265.1(2) argument because the City’s cause of action occurred before 
2005, when the cap on punitive damages was enacted.44 The trial court 
denied all remaining post-trial motions.45 McCall, Fleming, and the Fund 




37 Id. at *8-9. 




42 “No award of punitive damages against any defendant shall exceed the greater of: (1) 
Five hundred thousand dollars; or (2) Five times the net amount of the judgment awarded 
to the plaintiff against the defendant.” MO. REV. STAT. § 510.265.1 (2000); see also 
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appealed.46 The City cross-appealed the trial court’s remitter of punitive 
damages.47 
 
McCall and Fleming filed a consolidated brief and did not challenge 
the trial court’s finding of liability, but instead raised three other points on 
appeal.48 In their first point, McCall and Fleming argued that the trial court 
erred in submitting the damages instructions on the City’s nuisance and 
trespass claims.49  The appellate court denied this argument.50 The appellate 
court also denied McCall and Fleming’s second point, holding that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant their motions for a 
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.51 Similarly, 
the appellate court denied McCall and Fleming’s third point, holding that the 
trial court did not err in failing to order remittitur of the jury award of 
compensatory damages.52 
 
The Fund raised an additional seven points on appeal.53 The appellate 
court denied the first six points, agreeing only with the Fund’s seventh and 
final point on appeal that the trial court erred in limiting punitive damages in 
accordance with § 510.265.1(2).54 The appellate court denied the Fund’s first 
                                                
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *10. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at *21. The appellate court held that the trial court’s damages instruction did not 
misstate Missouri trespass law because “substantive trespass law authorizes the recovery 
of consequential damages proximately caused by a trespass.” Id. at *15. The court held 
further that the reference to consequential damages was sufficiently definite “to inform he 
jury of the legal standard [the jury] was required to apply” and thus did not constitute a 
prohibited “roving commission.” Id. at *19.  
51 Id. at *21. The testimony of Shaun Thomas, former employee of Midwest 
Remediation, relating to the contamination-related costs did not prevent the jury from 
crediting the City’s evidence relating to the contamination-related costs; thus, the City 
made a “submissible case” and defendants were not entitled to a directed verdict nor a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at *21, *24, *57.  
52 Id. at *27. McCall and Fleming argued that the compensatory damages should be 
remitted in accordance with Shaun Thomas’s testimony regarding the contamination-
related costs, but the appellate court found once again that Thomas’s testimony did not 
prevent the jury from awarding the City the greater amount sought. Id. at *28. 
53 Id. at *28-*57.  
54 Id. at *31-*57. 
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point on appeal because when “the Fund failed to move for a directed verdict 
during trial on the basis asserted in its first point, it did not preserve that issue 
as a basis for [judgment notwithstanding the verdict], or for appellate 
review.”55 The Fund’s second point was also denied, holding that the trial 
court did not err in denying the Fund’s motion for a directed verdict because 
the City presented substantial evidence to establish that the City relied on 
Vuchetich’s representations.56 The appellate court also held that § 319.131.5 
did not prevent a judgment against the Fund for compensatory and punitive 
damages “based on its own fraud or negligent misrepresentations,” thus 
denying the Fund’s third point on appeal.57 In its fourth point, the Fund 
argued, and the appellate court denied, that the statements made by 
Vuchetich on April 15, 2004, were too vague and uncertain to support a 
causes of action for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, and the 
instructions given to the jury on those claims were impermissible roving 
commissions.58 The appellate court also denied the Fund’s fifth point, 
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence 
of settlement discussions following the April 15, 2004 meeting between the 
City and the Fund.59 The appellate court’s final denial was of the Fund’s sixth 
                                                
55 Id. at *30-*31. The Fund argued in its first point that the City “could not have actually 
or justifiably relied on any statements made by Vuchetich at the April 15, 2004 meeting 
that the Fund would indemnify the City for the entirety of Midwest Remediation’s net 
costs” because such reliance was prevented by Vuchetich’s later letter offering to settle 
the Fund’s liability for $50,000. Id. at *29. 
56 Id. at *34-*35. The appellate court reasoned that the City’s submissible case included 
evidence that the City relied on the Fund’s representations when it decided to “hire 
Midwest Remediation…without a competitive bidding process; and to accept the less 
costly alternative of leaving much of the contaminated soil in place, rather than 
excavating all of it.” Id. at *34. 
57 Id. at *39. “The fund shall not compensate . . . any third party . . . for any loss or 
damages of an intangible nature, including . . . punitive damages.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
319.131.5 (2000). 
58 Id. at *40. Evidence that the City Administrator, City Engineer, and Rose-Lan 
representative all took Vuchetich’s statements at the meeting to mean the Fund would 
pay for all costs incurred by the City if it hired Midwest Remediation, less what Rose-
Lan would have charged made the statements not too vague or uncertain, thus supporting 
a cause of action for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. Id. at *40-*41. 
Additionally, the instructions used in the verdict director was not misleading in the 
context of the evidence and thus did not involve a roving commission. Id.  
59 Id. at *42-*43. The appellate court found that the exclusion of evidence did not 
prejudice the Fund because the excluded evidence was “merely additional evidence of the 
same kind bearing upon the same point.” Id. at *47-*49 (internal citations omitted). 
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point, which argued that the trial court erred in submitting punitive damages 
to the jury because there was insufficient evidence of malicious conduct.60  
 
However, the Missouri Western District Court of Appeals agreed with 
the Fund’s argument that the trial court erred “by entering judgment against 
[the Fund] for punitive damages of $2,500,000, because under § 
510.265.1(2), punitive damages are limited to . . . five times the net amount 
of the damages awarded to the plaintiff.”61 The court reasoned that § 
510.265.1 applied in this case because the legislature specified the cap on 
punitive damages would apply to “all causes of action filed after August 28, 
2005.”62 The City filed its lawsuit in November of 2005; therefore, the 
punitive damages cap is applicable.63 
 
The Western District Court of Appeals thereafter affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment, but modified the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.1464 to 
reduce the punitive damages awarded against the Fund to $860,504.90, 
rejecting the trial court’s refusal to apply § 510.265.1(2).65 Thus, when a 
statute limiting punitive damages has an enactment date and a plaintiff files a 
cause of action after that enactment date, the statute is applicable even if the 




                                                
60 Id. at *49-*50. The appellate court held the City had a submissible case for punitive 
damages of the evidence because the evidence involved Vuchetich’s encouragement to 
hire Midwest Remediation, his advice that Midwest Remediation’s bid was reasonable, 
his statements that the Fund would pay, the Fund’s refusal to pay because remedial costs 
were too high, the Fund’s continuance on the basis that it was not responsible for 
contamination north of the creek, and the unreasonable delay caused by the Fund. Id. at 
*49-*56. 
61 Id. at *56. 
62 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.305 (2000) (emphasis added); id. at *57. 
63 McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *57. 
64 “The appellate court shall award a new trial or partial new trial, reverse or affirm the 
judgment or order of the trial court, in whole or in part, or give such judgment as the 
court ought to give. Unless justice otherwise requires, the court shall dispose finally of 
the case.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.14.  
65 McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *70-*71. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Missouri Constitution provides “[t]hat no ex post facto law, no 
law impairing the obligation of contract, or retrospective in its operation, or 
making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be 
enacted.”66 Therefore, the general rule is that statutes are not applied 
retroactively.67 The two exceptions that would for retroactive application 
include: “(1) where the legislature shows an intent that it be applied 
retroactive[ly], and (2) where the statute is procedural only and does not 
affect any substantive rights of the parties.”68 Therefore, the law is settled on 
the fact that the legislature cannot change the “substantive” law for a 
category of damages after a cause of action has accrued.69 A substantive law 
“relates to rights and duties giving rise to the cause of action, while 
procedural statutes supply the machinery used to effect the suit.”70 Stated 
another way, “[s]ubstantive laws fix and declare primary rights and remedies 
of individuals concerning their person or property, while remedial statutes 
affect only the remedy provided, including laws that substitute a new or more 
appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right.”71 
 
However, regarding procedural provisions, the law is quite clear that 
“[n]o person can claim a vested right in any particular mode of procedure . . . 
and where a statute deals only with procedure it applies to all actions, 
including those pending or filed in the future.”72 The Fourteenth Amendment 
only guarantees a party, “the preservation of his substantial right to redress 
by some effective procedure.”73 Thus, the U.S. Constitution does not prevent 
a procedural or remedial provision from being applied retroactively.74 
 
The Missouri Supreme Court, in Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting, Co., 
expressly stated that under Missouri law, “punitive damages are remedial and 
                                                
66 MO. CONST. ART. I, § 13.  
67 In re Estate of Wilkinson, 843 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992). 
68 Id. (emphasis added). 
69 Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 760 (Mo. 2010). 
70 Patrick v. Clark Oil & Ref. Co., 965 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998) (quoting 
Stark v. Missouri State Treasurer, 954 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. App. 1997).. 
71 Files v. Wetterau, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). 
72 Scheidegger v. Greene, 451 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Mo. 1970).  
73 Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933).  
74 Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 708 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. 1986). 
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a plaintiff has no vested right to such damages prior to the entry of 
judgment.”75 Further, “the purpose of punitive damages is to inflict 
punishment and to serve as an example and deterrent to similar conduct.”76  
 
Rather than to compensate the victim, punitive damages follow a 
public policy rationale, which is that punitive damages should be awarded in 
some cases in the interest of society.77 Thus, an act barring or limiting 
punitive damages “cannot be said to deny any constitutional right.”78 Instead, 
punitive damages are awarded wholly within the discretion of the trier of fact 
and the remedial nature of punitive damages make them never allowable as a 
matter of right.79 
 
However, punitive damages can also be labeled as substantive. In 
another Missouri Supreme Court decision, Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
USA, N.A., the court did not allow for a punitive damages statute to be 
applied retroactively because it affected a substantive right.80 The court in 
Hess stated that because the Missouri Constitution prohibits laws that are 
retrospective in operation, the Constitution prohibits a law “if it takes away 
or impairs vested or substantial rights acquired under existing laws or 
imposes new obligations, duties, or disabilities with respect to past 
transactions.”81 Typically, a law is described as either procedural or 
substantive with “substantive law relat[ing] to the rights and duties giving 
rise to the cause of action, while procedural law is the machinery used for 
carrying on the suit.”82 Procedural and remedial statutes may be applied 
retroactively, while laws that provide for new penalties are substantive and 
cannot be applied retroactively.83 However, it is possible for the statute to be 
read in both a remedial and substantive way.84 “When a statute is . . . 
                                                
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321, 327 (Ill. 1958). 
78 Id. 
79 Vaughan, 708 S.W.2d at 660. 
80 Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 769-771 (Mo. banc 
2007). 
81 Id. at 769. 
82 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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remedial in one part while penal in another, it should be considered a 
remedial statute when enforcement of the remedy is sought” and applied 
retroactively, but considered “penal when enforcement of the penalty is 
sought” and applied prospectively.85 Thus, while punitive damages are 
remedial in nature to the plaintiff, a statute authorizing the award of punitive 
damages imposes a new obligation on the defendant, creating a substantive 
issue and, therefore, does not allow for retrospective application.86 
 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
 
In the instant case, the Missouri Western District Court of Appeals 
found that the trial court erred by refusing to apply MO. REV. STAT. § 
510.265.1(2).87 Therefore, because § 510.265.1(2) should have been applied, 
the punitive damages should have been limited to five times the net amount 
of the damages awarded to the plaintiff.88 
 
The court noted that the legislature specified that § 510.265.1(2)’s cap 
on punitive damages would apply to “all causes of action filed after August 
28, 2005.”89 After the punitive damages cap became effective, the City filed 
its lawsuit in November of 2005. As such, the court is required to apply the 
punitive damages cap.90 
 
The court also noted that although “it is well established the Missouri 
Constitution prohibits laws that are retrospective in operation,” the Missouri 
Supreme Court has not characterized a plaintiff’s right to punitive damages 
as “substantive.”91 The court relied on precedent that stated, “[U]nder 
Missouri law, punitive damages are remedial and a plaintiff has no vested 
                                                
85 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
86 Id. at 771-72.  
87 City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. Stations, No. WD 74429, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 
192, at *2 (Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014).  
88 Id. 
89 MO. REV. STAT. § 538.305 (2000). Sections 510.265 and 538.305 were both enacted as 
part of H.B. 292, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. and Veto Sess. (Mo. 2000). See 2005 Mo. 
Laws. 641, 647, 655. McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *57 (emphasis added). 
90 Id. at *57.  
91 Id. at *58-60 (quoting Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, 311 S.W.3d 752, 759-
760 (Mo. 2010)); See Mo Const. art. I, sec. 13.  
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right to such damages prior to the entry of judgment.”92 Further, according to 
Vaughan, “Punitive damages are never allowable as a matter of right and 
their award lies wholly within the discretion of the trier of fact.”93 The court 
then concluded that punitive damages are remedial and in this case “the City 
had no vested right to punitive damages at the time the 2005 statute went into 
effect.”94  
 
Therefore, the well-established rule that the Missouri Constitution 
prohibits laws that are retrospective does not prevent § 510.265.1(2) from 
being applied in this case because the Constitutional provision does not apply 
to a statute dealing with only a remedial measure.95 The court thus reduced 
the punitive damages awarded against the Fund to be in compliance with § 




 Section 538.300 states that all provisions of the new tort reform act,97 
including § 510.265.1’s cap on punitive damages, “applies to all actions filed 
after August 28, 2005.”98 However, “this provision makes no distinction for 
cases in which the cause of action accrued prior to August 28.”99 In this case, 
the constitutional challenge against retroactive legislation arose because the 
                                                
92 City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. Stations, No. WD 74429, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 
192, at *61 (Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014) (quoting Vaughan, 708 S.W.2d at 660-661). 
93 Id. (quoting Vaughan, 708 S.W.2d at 660). 
94 McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *64-65. 
95 Id. The City did argue that the statute violates its right to trial by jury and is therefore 
unconstitutional. Id. at *65. However, the City failed to make this argument at any time 
in the trial court and thus “where a party first challenges the constitutionality of a statute 
on appeal, the issue has not been preserved for appellate review.” Id. at *67-69 (internal 
quotations omitted).  
96 Id. at *70-71. 
97 The Tort Reform Act included sections 510.265 and 538.305, which were both enacted 
as part of H.B. 393. See  
H.B. 393, 2005 93rd Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess.; McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 
192, at *3 and *57. 
98 Paul J. Passanante & Dawn M. Mefford, Anticipated Constitutional Challenges to Tort 
Reform, 62 J. MO. B. 206, 211 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.305 (West 2015) 
(emphasis added).   
99 Paul J. Passanante & Dawn M. Mefford, Anticipated Constitutional Challenges to Tort 
Reform, 62 J. MO. B. 206, 211 (2006).  
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cause of action accrued prior to August 28, 2005, but the City did not file an 
action until November of 2005, after the punitive damages limitation cap 
became effective.100 
 
The Missouri Western District Court of Appeals considered itself 
bound to follow the specific holding of Vaughan, “despite more general 
statements in other cases which arguably point in the different 
direction.”101Although Vaughan specifically addressed “whether a statute 
limiting the recovery of punitive damages may be retrospectively applied to a 
cause of action accruing before the statute’s enactment,” the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on punitive damages being procedural or remedial 
in nature does not agree with earlier Missouri Supreme Court statements.102 
In fact, Missouri courts are generally reluctant to retroactively apply newly 
enacted legislation.103 
 
Specifically, the Missouri Supreme Court has asserted that “[m]erely 
to label certain consequences as substantive and others as procedural” is not 
decisive of the retrospectivity question.104 Missouri law has not clearly 
distinguished procedural rights from substantive rights.105 The court has 
instead stated that the distinction between procedural and substantive law 
“has frequently proved elusive.”106 
 
Rather than merely labeling consequences as substantive or 
procedural, the court suggests that in order to analyze whether or not 
retroactivity exists, the court should be guided by the principle “than an act or 
transaction, to which certain legal effects were ascribed at the time they 
transpired, should not, without cogent reasons, thereafter be subject to 
different set of effects which alter the rights and liabilities of the parties.”107 
                                                
100 McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *57. 
101 Id. at *64 & n.10. 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
103 Cook v. Newman, 142 S.W.3d 880, 893 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).  
104 McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *63-64 (quoting State ex rel. St. Louis-San 
Francisco Railway Co. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 1974)). 
105 PASSANANTE & MEFFORD, supra note 98, at 213. 
106 State ex. rel. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409, 410 
(Mo. banc 1974). 
107 McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *64 and *3 (quoting Buder, 515 S.W.2d at 
411) (emphasis added).  
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Further within a court’s analysis, the “notions of justice and fair play in a 
particular case are always germane.”108 This language seems to blur the 
distinction between substantive and procedural law even more. 
 
The notion that punitive damages are a procedural right was 
conflicted in Hess, which held that a statute authorizing the award of punitive 
damages created a substantive issue and could not be applied retroactively.109 
Notably, the decision in Hess is distinguishable from the instant case because 
Hess involved a new statute that authorized the imposition of punitive 
damages for the first time, whereas in this case punitive damages were 
simply limited.110 However, other states have disregarded the distinction 
between the imposition of punitive damages and the limitations of such 
damages. 
 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Majors v. Good, held that 
limitations on punitive damages constitute changes in substantive rights.111 In 
a case previous to Majors, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held “statutory 
increases in damage limitations are changes in substantive rights and not 
mere remedial changes.”112 The Majors court thus reasoned that “[o]f no less 
effect are the statutory limitations on all recoverable damages.”113 
Concluding that the amendment limiting punitive damages should be applied 
prospectively only because “[l]imitations on damages, whether actual or 
punitive, can constitute changes in substantive rights.”114  
 
The Supreme Court of Florida also held that limitations on punitive 
damages constitute changes in substantive rights.115 In Alamo Rent-A-Car v. 
Mancusi, the Florida court considered the issue of retroactivity regarding a 
cause of action that accrued before the enactment of a statute limiting 
                                                
108 Buder, 515 S.W.2d at 411. 
109 Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 769-772 (Mo. banc 
2007). 
110 McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *62-63 and *3. 
111 Majors v. Good, 832 P.2d 420, 422 (Okla. 1992). 




115 Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994). 
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punitive damages but was filed after the statute was in place.116 The court 
ultimately found that a punitive damages cap did not apply retroactively to a 
cause of action even though the cause of action was filed after the effective 
date of the cap.117 Florida’s punitive damages limitation statute, section 
768.73(1)(a), was enacted by the legislature in 1986 and “applies only to 
causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1986, and does not apply to any 
cause of action arising before that date.”118 In Alamo, the cause of action 
arose in September 1986.119 However, Alamo involved misconduct in 
commercial transactions, and the punitive damages cap did not include 
“misconduct in commercial transactions” language when it was first 
enacted.120 Instead, an amendment was added to include such misconduct, 
but the amendment did not become effective until October 1, 1987.121 One 
day after this amendment became effective; the plaintiff filed the cause of 
action.122 
 
The Florida Supreme Court examined whether the amendment was 
one of substantive or procedural law in order to determine whether the 
amendment applied to the cause of action.123 In its analysis, the court laid out 
the differences between substantive and procedural law124 by stating that 
“substantive law prescribes duties and rights and procedural law concerns the 
means and methods to apply and enforce those duties and rights.”125 
Following this rationale, the court found that the punitive damages cap is 
substantive rather than procedural, thus the amendment to the punitive 
damages cap did not apply retroactively.126 The court further stated, “punitive 
damages are assessed not as compensation to an injured party but as 
punishment against the wrongdoer.”127 Consequently, the court determined 
that the establishment or elimination of a punitive damages claim “is clearly a 
                                                
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fla. Sta. § 768.71(2)). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. §768.73(1)(a) (1987)). 
121 Id. 
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substantive, rather than procedural, decision of the legislature because such a 
decision does, in fact, grant or eliminate a right or entitlement.”128 
 
Ohio case law also supports applying limitations on punitive damages 
only prospectively.129 In a case in the Ohio Court of Appeals, the court held 
that it could not apply a punitive damages cap to “causes of action that arose 
before the statute’s effective date even if some of the conduct giving rise to 
the cause of action occurred after the effective date.”130 In Blair, the cause of 
action accrued starting in 2001.131 The punitive damages cap in R.C. 
2315.21(D) became effective on April 7, 2005.132 The lawsuit was filed in 
September 2005.133 Therefore, the court found “the current version of R.C. 
2315.21 could not have been applied retroactively to that conduct.”134 Thus, 
the Ohio court stressed the importance of the timing of the conduct, which 
warranted claims for punitive damages in relation to the enactment of 
punitive damages cap, rather than focusing on when the cause of action was 
filed. 
 
The Supreme Court of Alabama also examined when the cause of 
action accrued in relation to the application of the punitive damages cap.135 
Alabama’s cap on punitive damages under Alabama Code 1975 § 6-11-20 
specifically provides that the cap “does not apply to a plaintiff whose cause 
of action accrued prior to the date the act became effective — June 11, 
1987.”136 Thus, the court found that because the plaintiff’s “cause of action 
accrued prior to that date . . . her recovery is not limited by this cap.”137 
 
Georgia’s punitive damages limitation also provides language that 
determines applicability by when the cause of action accrued, rather than 
when it was filed. Section 51-12-5.1(h) provides, “[t]his Code section shall 
                                                
128 Id. 
129 Blair v. McDonagh, 894 N.E.2d 377, 391 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 





135 Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 878, 883 (Ala. 1991). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. (emphasis added).  
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apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 14, 1997.”138 In 
Scriver v. Lister, the Georgia Court of Appeals found no error in the trial 
court’s award of punitive damages when the trial court refused to 
retroactively apply a cap on punitive damages.139 The court upheld the trial 
court’s finding that “the cause of action in this case arose from [the 
defendant’s] actions in 1985 and 1986; therefore, this case is not subject to 
the current . . . cap on punitive damage awards.”140 
 
The Supreme Court of Montana is yet another state that has held 
limitations on punitive damages does not apply retroactively.141 In Murphy 
Homes, Inc. v. Mueller, all of the relevant events in the case, including the 
filing of the lawsuit, took place before the amendment limiting punitive 
damages was in effect.142 However, the timing of the filing still did not seem 
to affect the court’s reasoning. Instead, the court simply looked to Montana 
law, which provides that “[n]o law contained in any of the statutes of 
Montana is retroactive unless expressly so declared.”143 Thus, the court held 
the statutory limitation on punitive damages did not apply.144 
 
A number of states have implemented statutes similar to MO. REV. 
STAT. § 510.265.1, limiting the amount of recovery for punitive damages.145 
However, within these states there is limited case law regarding the issue of 
retroactively applying such limitations on causes of action that were filed 
after the enactment date of the punitive damages cap but accrued prior to the 
date of enactment.  
 
Under the Missouri Constitution, it is a general rule that statutes are 
not applied retroactively.146 However, the Missouri Western District Court of 
                                                
138 O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 (2010). 
139 Scriver v. Lister, 510 S.E.2d 59, 62-3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). 
140 Id. 
141 Murphy Homes, Inc. v. Muller, 162 P.3d 106, 120 (Mont. 2007). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. (quoting § 1-2-109, MCA).  
144 Murphy Homes, Inc., 162 P.3d at 120. 
145 These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, Limitations 
on Recovery—Limiting the Dollar Amount, Punitive Damages: Law and Prac. 2d § 21:17 
(2015 ed.).  
146 In re Estate of Wilkinson, 843 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).  
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Appeals in this case followed the reasoning of Vaughan, allowing for the 
statute limiting punitive damages to be applied retroactively.147 The court 
merely labeled limitations of punitive damages as remedial and determined 
the City had no vested right to such damages prior to the entry of 
judgment,148 even though the Missouri Supreme Court asserted that merely 
labeling consequences is not decisive of retrospectivity.149 The Western 
District Court of Appeals seemed to ignore the principle that “an act or 
transaction, to which certain legal effects were ascribed at the time they 
transpired, should not . . . be subject to different set of effects which alter the 
rights and liabilities of the parties.”150 Here, the punitive damages cap altered 
the liability of the Fund.  
 
Additionally, in Vaughan, the Missouri Supreme Court stated punitive 
damages are awarded wholly within the discretion of the trier of fact.151 Here, 
the trier of fact acted within its discretion and gave a punitive damages award 
to the City. However, this award was retroactively limited by the legislature, 
simply because the City filed their claim after the statute was enacted even 
though the harm relating to the cause of action accrued prior to that date. 
This seems counterintuitive to the “notions of justice and fair play.” Missouri 
has blurred the distinction between substantive and procedural law by this 
language and by its holding in Hess. 
 
 In Majors v. Good, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held similarly to 
Hess, finding that the increases in damage limitations are changes in 
substantive rights and not mere remedial changes.152 However, instead of 
attempting to make a distinction between increases and limitations on 
punitive damages or reading the statute in such a way that it is both remedial 
and substantive, Oklahoma held all limitations on damages, whether actual or 
punitive, are substantive and should only be applied prospectively.153 
 
                                                
147 City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. Stations, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *61 
(Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014).  
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 63-64, n.10 (quoting Buder, 515 S.W.2d at 411) (emphasis added). 
150 Id. 
151 Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 708 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. 1986). 
152 Majors v. Good, 832 P.2d 420 (Okla. 1992).  
153 Id. 
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 The Supreme Court of Florida, like the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
also examined whether a law is substantive or procedural in order to 
determine whether the law applied to the cause of action. The Florida 
Supreme Court stated the difference is that “substantive law prescribes duties 
and rights and procedural law concerns the means and methods to apply and 
enforce those duties and rights.”154 The Missouri Supreme Court stated the 
difference is that a substantive law “relates to rights and duties giving rise to 
the cause of action, while procedural statutes supply the machinery used to 
effect the suit.”155 Both courts use essentially the exact same language when 
describing the difference between substantive and procedural law. Further, 
the Florida Supreme Court stated “punitive damages are assessed not as 
compensation to an injured party but as punishment against the 
wrongdoer.”156 The Missouri Supreme Court stated “the purpose of punitive 
damages is to inflict punishment and to serve as an example and deterrent to 
similar conduct.”157 Like in Alamo, where the punitive damages limitation 
statue affected a substantive law and where the plaintiff filed suit after the 
limitation was enacted, Missouri’s punitive damages limitation affected a 
substantive law. Therefore, this limitation should not be applied retroactively, 
regardless of the fact that the City filed after the statute’s enactment date.158  
 
Like in the Ohio case, Blair v. McDonagh, where the cause of action 
accrued before the statute’s effective date, but was filed after the enactment 
of the statute, here the cause of action against the Fund accrued before the 
statute’s effective date.159 The Fund made fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentations to the City during the negotiations in which Vuchetich, 
representing the Fund, convinced the City to leave the contaminated soil in 
place and substitute petroleum-resistant piping. These misrepresentations 
continued and were clearly evidenced by the testimony of individuals at the 
April 15, 2004 meeting. Further, on August 4, 2004, the City's attorney sent a 
letter to Vuchetich stating that the City was going forward in reliance on his 
promise that the Fund would pay the full amount of Midwest Remediation’s 
costs, and the Fund still did not reimburse the City for Midwest 
                                                
154 Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994).  
155 Patrick v. Clark Oil & Ref. Co., 965 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
156 Alamo Rent-A-Car, 632 So. 2d at 1358.  
157 Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 708 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. 1986). 
158 See Alamo Rent-A-Car, 632 So. 2d 1352. 
159 See Blair v. McDonagh, 894 N.E.2d 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
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Remediation’s work. Although the City did not file this action until 
September of 2015, the cause of action still accrued before the effective date 
of the statute and therefore “could not have applied retroactively to that 
conduct.”160  
 
Further, in both Alabama and Georgia, the punitive damages cap’s 
application is determined by when the cause of action accrued rather than 
was filed.161 Like the Georgia Court of Appeals, the court here should have 
found no error in the trial court’s award of punitive damages when the trial 




Retroactively applying the statutory cap on punitive damages, 
imposed by MO. REV. STAT. § 510.265, raises the issue of whether this 
application violates the Missouri Constitution. In City of Harrisonville v. 
McCall Serv. Stations, the Missouri Western District Court of Appeals 
allowed for retroactive application because it deemed the statutory cap on 
punitive damages as a procedural issue and not one of substantive law. With 
this decision, Missouri follows some historical decisions while seeming to go 
against others. Further, Missouri departs from rulings of other states that 
apply statutory caps on punitive damages prospectively. The Missouri 
Supreme Court recently ordered the cause transferred on September 30, 2014, 
so it remains to be seen if Missouri will take the side of the defendants and 
continue to protect defendants by retroactively applying limitations on 
punitive damages. 
    
 
 
                                                
160 Id. at 282. 
161 Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 878, 883 (Ala. 1991); Scriver v. 
Lister, 510 S.E.2d 59, 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).  
